Citations are from "Philosophical Writings of Peirce" by Justus Buchler ISBN 0486202178
# Concerning the Author
"The first strictly philosophical books that I read were of the classical German schools; and I became so deeply imbued with many of their ways of thinking that I have never been able to disabuse myself of them. Yet my attitude was always that of a dweller in a laboratory... not that of philosophers bred in theological seminaries. I devoted two hours a day to the study of Kant's Critic of the Pure Reason for more than three years, until I almost knew the whole book by heart..." pg.1-2 ibid.
# The Fixation of Belief
Reference to the Kantian a priori and a posteriori: "The division is between those [facts] which are necessarily taken for granted in asking why a certain conclusion is thought to follow from certain premisses, and those which are not implied in such a question" pg. 9 ibid.
Reference to Hegelian (maybe it's Kantian?) concept of 'Picture-Thinking': "A quality, as such, is never an object of observation. We can see that a thing is blue or green, but the quality of being blue and the quality of being green are not things which we see; they are products of logical reflections." pg.9 ibid. Hegel defines 'Picture-Thinking' as that exact type of 'logical reflection'; the act of attaching predicates to subjects is itself picture-thinking.
Peirce, in an incredibly succinct way, ties doubt and belief to both praxis and emotion:
Emotion: Doubt provides an emotion of uneasiness, and belief provides an emotion of comfort.
Praxis: But this emotion is also practical: "The Assassins, or followers of the Old Man of the Mountain, used to rush into death at his least command, because they *believed* that obedience to him would insure everlasting felicity... Doubt has not the least such active effect, but stimulates us into inquiry until it is destroyed." pg. 10 ibid. Beliefs are what make our habits.
This also ties back to Kant: a priori facts are our most convictive "beliefs".
The act of "settling an opinion", forming a belief out of an irritation from doubt, is what Peirce calls "Inquiry" pg. 10 ibid. This is what Enlightenment philosophers called "Reason" but Hegel called "Understanding" (Hegel believed Understanding was more powerful than Reason)
The act of trying to fix an opinion in an individual is "Tenacity". Since it's impossible for an individual to hold beliefs that won't be contradicted by another individual (leading to doubt) the collective/state/country inevitably collectivizes tenacity; it forms institutions that only educate people on the "correct" doctrines and they shame, "tar-and-feather", people "guilty of forbidden beliefs" pg. 13 ibid. This is "The Fixation of Belief" via "the method of authority"
"It is natural, therefore, that sympathy and fellowship should thus produce a most ruthless power" pg. 13 ibid. This echoes Erasmus’ critique of Platonic communism mentioned in ss. 45-46 ofPhilosophy of Right: Introduction
Pierce (unknowingly) ties tenacity to the economic concept of 'malinvestment': "[Tenacity through the method of authority's] success is proportionately greater; and, in fact, it has over and over again worked the most majestic results. The mere structure of stone which it has caused to be put together--in Siam, for example, in Egypt, and in Europe--have many of them a sublimity hardly more than rivalled by the greatest works of Nature"